krug on high keynes
here's the krug-man on JMK
( general theory )
===============================================
In the spring of 2005 a panel
of “conservative scholars and policy leaders”
was asked to identify
the most dangerous books
of the 19th and 20th centuries....
Charles Darwin and Betty Friedan
ranked high on the list.
But The General Theory
of Employment, Interest, and Money
did very well, too.
In fact, John Maynard Keynes beat out
V.I. Lenin and Frantz Fanon.
Keynes, who declared in the book’s
oft-quoted conclusion that
“soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests,
which are dangerous for good or evil,”
[384] would probably have been pleased.
Over the past 70 years
The General Theory has shaped the views
even of those who haven’t heard of it,
or who believe they disagree with it.
A businessman who warns that falling confidence
poses risks for the economy
is a Keynesian, whether he knows it or not.
A politician who promises
that his tax cuts will create jobs
by putting spending money
in peoples’ pockets is a Keynesian,
even if he claims to abhor the doctrine.
Even self-proclaimed supply-side economists,
who claim to have refuted Keynes,
fall back on unmistakably Keynesian stories
to explain why the economy
turned down in a given year....
It’s probably safe to assume
that the “conservative scholars and policy leaders”
who pronounced The General Theory
one of the most dangerous books
of the past two centuries haven’t read it.
But they’re sure it’s a leftist tract,
a call for big government and high taxes....
[T]he arrival of Keynesian economics
in American classrooms
was delayed by a nasty case
of academic McCarthyism.
The first introductory textbook
to present Keynesian thinking,
written by the Canadian economist Lorie Tarshis,
was targeted by a right-wing pressure campaign
aimed at university trustees.
As a result of this campaign,
many universities that had planned
to adopt the book for their courses
cancelled their orders,
and sales of the book,
which was initially very successful,
collapsed.
Professors at Yale University,
to their credit,
continued to assign the book;
their reward was to be attacked
by the young William F. Buckley
for propounding “evil ideas.”
But Keynes was no socialist
- he came to save capitalism,
not to bury it.
And there’s a sense in which
The General Theory was... a conservative book....
Keynes wrote during a time of mass unemployment,
of waste and suffering
on an incredible scale.
A reasonable man might well have concluded
that capitalism had failed,
and that only... the nationalization
of the means of production -
could restore economic sanity....
Keynes argued that these failures
had surprisingly narrow, technical causes...
because Keynes saw the causes of mass unemployment
as narrow and technical,
he argued that the problem’s solution
could also be narrow and technical:
the system needed a new alternator,
but there was no need to replace the whole car.
In particular,
“no obvious case is made out
for a system of State Socialism
which would embrace most of the economic life
of the community.”...
Keynes argued that much less intrusive
government policies could ensure
adequate effective demand,
allowing the market economy
to go on as before.
Still, there is a sense
in which free-market fundamentalists are right
to hate Keynes.
If your doctrine says that free markets,
left to their own devices,
produce the best of all possible worlds,
and that government intervention
in the economy always makes things worse,
Keynes is your enemy.
And he is an especially dangerous enemy
because his ideas have been vindicated
so thoroughly by experience.
Stripped down, the conclusions of The General Theory
might be expressed
as four bullet points:
Economies can and often do suffer
from an overall lack of demand,
which leads to involuntary unemployment
The economy’s automatic tendency
to correct shortfalls in demand,
if it exists at all,
operates slowly and painfully
Government policies to increase demand,
by contrast,
can reduce unemployment quickly
Sometimes increasing the money supply
won’t be enough to persuade
the private sector to spend more
, and government spending
must step into the breach
To a modern practitioner of economic policy,
none of this - except, possibly, the last point -
sounds startling
or even especially controversial.
But these ideas weren’t just radical
when Keynes proposed them;
they were very nearly unthinkable.
And the great achievement
of The General Theory
was precisely to make them thinkable....
So now let’s talk about the core of the book,
and what it took for Keynes to write it....
In Book I, as Keynes gives us
a first taste of what he’s going to do,
he writes of Malthus,
whose intuition told him
that general failures of demand were possible,
but had no model to back that intuition:
“[S]ince Malthus was unable
to explain clearly
(apart from an appeal to the facts of common observation)
how and why effective demand
could be deficient or excessive
, he failed to provide an alternative construction;
and Ricardo conquered England
as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain"
.”... That need to “provide an alternative construction”
explains many of the passages in The General Theory
that, 70 years later,
can seem plodding or even turgid....
When you’re challenging a long-established orthodoxy,
the vision thing doesn’t work
unless you’re very precise about the details....
Keynes’s struggle with classical economics
was much more difficult
than we can easily imagine today.
Modern introductory economics textbooks
- the new book by Krugman and Wells included -
usually contain a discussion
of something we call the “classical model”
of the price level.
But that model offers far too flattering a picture
we call the classical model today
is really a post-Keynesian attempt
to rationalize pre-Keynesian views....
The real classical model... was,
essentially, a model of a barter economy,
in which money and nominal prices
don’t matter,
with a monetary theory of the price level
appended in a non-essential way,
like a veneer on a tabletop.
It was a model in which Say’s Law applied....
One measure of how hard it was for Keynes
to divest himself of Say’s Law
is that to this day some people deny
what Keynes realized -
that the “law” is, at best,
a useless tautology when individuals
have the option of accumulating money
rather than purchasing real goods and services....
There’s a widespread impression
among modern macroeconomists t
hat we’ve left Keynes behind,
for better or for worse.
But that impression, I’d argue,
is based either on a misreading or a nonreading....
If you don’t read Keynes himself
, but only read his work
as refracted through various interpreters,
it’s easy to imagine
that The General Theory is much cruder than it is.
... Let me address one issue in particular:
did Paul Samuelson,
whose 1948 textbook introduced
the famous 45-degree diagram
to explain the multiplier,
misrepresent what Keynes was all about?
There are commentators who insist passionately
that Samuelson defiled the master’s thought
. Yet I can’t see any significant difference
between Samuelson’s formulation
and Keynes’s own equation for equilibrium employment,
right there in Chapter 3: [29].
Represented graphically,
Keynes’s version looks a lot like Samuelson’s diagram;
quantities are measured in wage units
rather than constant dollars,
and the nifty 45-degree feature is absent,
but the logic is exactly the same.
The bottom line, then,
is that we really are all Keynesians now
A very large part of what modern macroeconomists do
derives directly from The General Theory;
the framework Keynes introduced
holds up very well to this day.
Yet there were, of course, important things
that Keynes missed or failed to anticipate.
The strongest criticism one can make
of The General Theory is that Keynes
mistook an episode for a trend.
He wrote in a decade
when even a near-zero interest rate
wasn’t low enough to restore full employment,
and brilliantly explained
the implications of that fact -
in particular, the trap in which the Bank of England
and the Federal Reserve found themselves,
unable to create employment
no matter how much they tried
to increase the money supply.
He knew that matters had not always been thus.
But he believed, wrongly,
that the monetary environment of the 1930s
would be the norm from then on....
In the United States the era
of ultra-low interest rates ended in the 1950s...
Yet the United States has,
in general, succeeded in achieving
adequate levels of effective demand.
The British experience has been similar.
And although there is large-scale unemployment
in continental Europe,
that unemployment seems
to have more to do with supply-side issues
than with sheer lack of demand....
[Keynes] underestimated the ability
of mature economies to stave off
diminishing returns.
Keynes’s “euthanasia of the rentier”
was predicated on the presumption
that as capital accumulates,
profitable private investment projects
become harder to find....
[T]he euthanasia of the rentier
does not seem imminent.
But there’s an even more important factor
that has kept interest rates relatively high,
and monetary policy effective:
persistent inflation,
which has become embedded in expectations....
[E]ven now, when inflation is considered low,
most of the 20-year rate reflects
expected inflation rather
than expected real returns.
The irony is that persistent inflation,
which makes The General Theory
seem on the surface somewhat less
directly relevant...
can be attributed in part to Keynes’s influence,
for better or worse.
For worse: the inflationary takeoff
of the 1970s was partly caused
by expansionary monetary and fiscal policy,
adopted by Keynes-influenced governments
with unrealistic employment goals....
For better: both the Bank of England,
explicitly, and the Federal Reserve, implicitly,
have a deliberate strategy
of encouraging persistent low
but positive inflation,
precisely to avoid finding themselves
in the trap Keynes diagnosed....
What makes The General Theory truly unique...
is that it combined towering intellectual achievement
with immediate practical relevance
to a global economic crisis....
There has been nothing
like Keynes’s achievement
in the annals of social science.
Perhaps there can’t be.
Keynes was right about the problem of his day:
the world economy had magneto trouble,
and all it took to get the economy
going again was a surprisingly narrow,
technical fix.
But most economic problems probably do
have complex causes and don’t have easy solutions....
Posted by pinky at March 9, 2006 10:24 AM