House of Paine: the great debate

November 13, 2005

the great debate

here is the main event folks

staged by the WSJ

my boy brad against this wall street bond merlin hack

==================

.Dooley high lites:

"an economically important bloc of (mostly Asian) countries
manages exchange rates to promote export growth
and rapid industrialization"

". Their primary economic problem
is the rapid assimilation
of hundreds of millions of workers
into a modern economy (China)
or an economic recovery (Japan)"

------ by throwing in japan he escapes
the south radius of his june nber paper ...

i wonder if he figures
labor slack inside a north country
with its temporary
near zero marginal product
is a good analogue
to his structural south model ???

seems if so
then the policy implications
become
not just
emerging one offery relevent
but emerged counter cyclical relevent too
as in the old beggar thy neighbor import tarrif games
and competitive devaluation rounds

i prefer keynes
a full employment fiscal deficit polcy
doesn't lead so obviously
to global great depressions ---------------

"Asian development policy
has generated very large purchases
of international reserves
and exports of savings to the rest of the world"

------------ no issue here ---------------

" We believe that the U.S. current-account deficit
is a byproduct of the ability of U.S. households and firms
to capture and profitably utilize this supply of internationally mobile savings"

---------- low mortgage rates and trans nat super profits
but how about stagnant north real wages ----------------------

"(this asian sourced) extra supply of savings .... in the U.S
has reduced long real interest rates by about 1.5 percentage points"

" It would be foolish to pass up such a bargain"

---------- as to this "baragin"'s benefits
to 'umble home owners..

isn't it
sort of
like what the spider
said to the fly .....

don't a lay strung out waiting for em
maybe even at the next step ????

a short run spending high
leading to
long run stag wage debt payment hang over
on houses with under water equity ???? ------------------

"The U.S. deficit and low interest rates
will last as long as Asian savings
are placed in the international market
by Asian governments
and as long as other industrial countries
are too weak to bid those savings away
from the U.S."

------------sloppy language here
"too weak "
isn't the real point
just as
this sudden high wave of "surplus" cash "glut"
inflowing from the south
lowered rates
a roll back out can raise em
here and all over the north
leaving the hideous high and dry
speared on a real rate of interest no man can stand for
an effect
often begging for a compensatory
but easily mis read
policy shift
toward a monetary base explosion ----------

" We predict that this will last for a decade
although the dollar will slowly depreciate
and U.S. rates will slowly rise
during this long adjustment period "

------------- this is pure salesmans blither

wheres the demo model ???

why assume soft rates of adjustment
when reality has
SO VERY OFTEN proves
to be a monster
of sudden and harsh swings ????--------------------

" Asian governments will want,
and be able to, feed international credit markets
as a part of their development strategy"

--------------that summary boast
reminds me of a thousand prior gaffs
of narrow hubris -------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----us chicken littles as dooley puts words in our mouth ------

" China will overheat, reserve holders will dump dollars,
and the U.S. will protect itself from low-priced goods"

---------------- what's his point
inflation a currency run and protectionism
are laughably unlikely ???-----------------

" Moreover, the system will end with a crisis
a la Argentina by the end of this year."

-------- well here i agree
u know i'd never compare uncle hegemonic
to a run of the mill southie
any arguments about the us ad its imperial dollar
require analogues from the annals
of earlier reserve currency states ----------

* * *
-----now u step forth ---------------

Setser writes:

" the taxpayers of poor Asian countries (above all China) subsidize
through their central bank's accumulation of dollar reserves
wealthy consumers in the U.S"

--------------- some dramatic telescoping here
the full run of the powdre trail back to the keg
is a way up ahead
but at least potentially
this is a "dead on " reality -------------------------

" You argued that this system was far more stable
than the naysayers thought and would last for a generation!"

----------------- indeed he shows no caution at all
in fact refuses to suggest unckle trim his sails at all ----------------

"no cause to worry if U.S. net external debt --
that is, the gap between American assets abroad and what the U.S. owes
the rest of the world --
rises from around 20% of U.S. GDP in 2003
to something like 75% of U.S. GDP in 2013."

------- here i think u need to have something better then too hogh is too high

as in a precedent i saw a delong bit
where he claimed the brits prior to 1914
were at ratios "higher"
then your scenario leads to in 10-15 years -----------------------

" that will happen even if the trade deficit stays at around 6% of GDP".

"By 2013, the current-account deficit,
which includes interest payments,
would reach 9% of U.S. GDP
even if the trade deficit stabilizes"

------- right here u need a comparative --------------------

" it is OK if the U.S. doesn't save
since the U.S. can outsource saving to Asia for some time"

----------- this does not disentangle the heavy trans nat
asia headed fdi out flow
from the massive uncle assisted household usury racket
are we realy
crowding out domestic investment in productive facilities
or merely witnessing "the markets "
trans nats' real investment choices
which involve going for the higher returns in asia ???--------------

"these trends are unsustainable. They imply a lot of external debt
for a country that doesn't export much.
And since external debt is ultimately
a claim on future U.S. exports
, it implies further falls in the dollar"

------this is the heart of your argument

can america earn enough to pay its debts

are we going to rely on a system of studios and labs
and the stream of IP payments
they can earn us
over seas
to pay our foreign debts ???

of course we have bases over there too
protection and extortion rackets
to compliment our resource and cheap labor extractions

the key here
is the possible divurgence between
gdp and gnp
if you are an american"property owner"
it might all come out...
"spiffing " --------------------------
-------

" just as Argentina's rising external debt burden
eventually led to falls in the peso"

------- see above on north south croos over analogies ------------

" Those now lending to the U.S. in dollars
for long terms at low rates risk large losses"

--------- indeed uncle could run the dollar down
but we'd have a pre global depression crisis-----------

" A collapse in 2006, maybe. A collapse before 2008, likely; before 2010, almost certainly."

----- i'd avoid this short run merlin stuff -------------------

" even if China and the world's oil exporters
want to continue to subsidize the U.S.
will the U.S. be willing to accept the gift.??"

------ i like that line a lot
free heroin ----------------

" We haven't exactly found a way
to make sure all parts of the economy
share equally in this subsidy "

------- this speaks silent volumes ------------------

" Do you all really think China will be able to continue
to rely as heavily on exports for growth in 2006
as it did in 2005?"

------ we both know the party bosses know better then that -----------------

* * *
back to

dooley:

" But investors, our primary audience,
are very short-run oriented "

"-- if they get it wrong
for more than a year or so, they become history"

------ ya but if you get it right for one quater at a time
u make them happy
either way
policy changes to make things optimal
are not like market specs who can make money rain or shine
so long as they beat the stampede in or out
even by only one step ---------------

" An elegant long-run theory
is of no use to us
if it doesn't have strong predictions
for the time horizon important to market participants "

------- they needn't worry either way
their neither peddling elegence or the long view
just showing the scam still has legs ---------------

"The key is the link between then and now"

dooley doe setser
or does he .....???

"Suppose a collapse was "likely before 2008"
and that that means greater than 50%
over the next 26 months."

" Moreover the crisis is defined by
sharply higher U.S. interest rates
and a mega-devaluation of the dollar"

" If this is the market consensus forecast"

" something has to give now.
Interest parity demands
that either yields on dollar assets
have to be much higher
to compensate investors for the risk
of large losses on dollar assets
or, more likely, investors dump dollar assets
and the crisis happens now."

"Neither has happened. The market doesn't buy your story -- why not?"

"The market could be wrong"

------- no the market crawls along day by day
with a few eyes looking out 2 quaters or so --------------

" it is time to focus
on how the international monetary system
evolves in the absence of crises"

----- no its not

to assume way the crisis
is to assume away
the basic modus operandi of the system
as it morphs from one stage to the next in its development ----------

"The trends in debt-GDP ratios you propose
assume the only adjustment is a crash
Like recent calculations
that we are running out of oil,
such extrapolations make exciting reading
but they do not capture market dynamics"

------- very poor analogy
and yet oil prices run up and down
as badly as if they were cycling thru scarcity and glut scares -------

" the incentives that have sustained the system to date
also provide a smooth convergence
to a new equilibrium in the long run."

--again just salesmans' words here --------

" Our recent paper sets this mechanism out in detail"

------ not at all
there is no detail
its more like a kidnappers note
here's your sons hair lock
etc etc
it gets the message
across alright
but
without revealing the ploteers where abouts or anything else
of much use to the police ------

" there will be a very slow but sure
real devaluation of the dollar
against the Asian bloc
and a very slow but sure
rise in cyclically adjusted real interest rates
in the U.S. and other industrial countries."

------ the dollar will fall against these east asian currencies
like it did against the yen....
maybe so
but i see no proof beyond
assertion
and "well we ain't hit any ice bergs yet "---------------

" As Asian savings become less of a bargain for the U.S.
there will be a gradual reduction
in the U.S. current-account deficit"

----- see he thinks the asians offer us a nice exit strategy --------------

" An interesting implication of our approach
is that, after a large initial appreciation
of the euro against the dollar,
this important exchange rate
will remain relatively stable
during the long adjustment period"

------ here is another kettle of fish
the difference
between the chinese product invasion of north america
and western europe
creating secondary tensions between the US and the EU ----------------

"There will be bumps along the road "

------ BUT NO CRISIS ???

TOO BAD WE CAN'T PLACE OUR
FINAL BETS NOW ---------

--------------------------------

" how can events we can't yet identify
deflect us from this underlying adjustment scenario"

------ he really needs to think about that
since his theory
is claiming he doesn't need to ---------------

• Global Balancing Act
October 18, 2005
Dooley :
"an economically important bloc of (mostly Asian) countries
manages exchange rates to promote export growth
and rapid industrialization"

". Their primary economic problem
is the rapid assimilation of hundreds of millions of workers
into a modern economy (China)
or an economic recovery (Japan)"

"Asian development policy
has generated very large purchases
of international reserves
and exports of savings to the rest of the world"

" We believe that the U.S. current-account deficit
is a byproduct of the ability of U.S. households and firms
to capture and profitably utilize this supply of internationally mobile savings"

"(this asian sourced) extra supply of savings .... in the U.S
has reduced long real interest rates by about 1.5 percentage points"

" It would be foolish to pass up such a bargain"

" We predict that this will last for a decade
although the dollar will slowly depreciate
and U.S. rates will slowly rise
during this long adjustment period "

From the start we have predicted that the

" Asian governments will want,
and be able to, feed international credit markets
as a part of their development strategy"

the chicken littles as dooley puts words in their mouth

" China will overheat, reserve holders will dump dollars,
and the U.S. will protect itself from low-priced goods".

" Moreover, the system will end with a crisis
a la Argentina by the end of this year."

* * *

Setser writes:

" the taxpayers of poor Asian countries (above all China) subsidize
through their central bank's accumulation of dollar reserves
wealthy consumers in the U.S"

" You argued that this system was far more stable
than the naysayers thought and would last for a generation!"

" that will happen even if the trade deficit stays at around 6% of GDP".

"By 2013, the current-account deficit,
which includes interest payments,
would reach 9% of U.S. GDP
even if the trade deficit stabilizes"

" it is OK if the U.S. doesn't save
since the U.S. can outsource saving to Asia for some time"

I -- and my colleague Nouriel Roubini -- do think t

" just as Argentina's rising external debt burden
eventually led to falls in the peso"

" Those now lending to the U.S. in dollars
for long terms at low rates risk large losses"

" A collapse in 2006, maybe. A collapse before 2008, likely; before 2010, almost certainly."

" even if China and the world's oil exporters
want to continue to subsidize the U.S.
will the U.S. be willing to accept the gift.??"

" We haven't exactly found a way
to make sure all parts of the economy
share equally in this subsidy "

" Do you all really think China will be able to continue
to rely as heavily on exports for growth in 2006
as it did in 2005?"

* * *

dooley:

" But investors, our primary audience,
are very short-run oriented "

"-- if they get it wrong
for more than a year or so, they become history"

" An elegant long-run theory
is of no use to us
if it doesn't have strong predictions
for the time horizon important to market participants "

"The key is the link between then and now"

dooley doe setser
or does he .....???

"Suppose a collapse was "likely before 2008"
and that that means greater than 50%
over the next 26 months."

" Moreover the crisis is defined by
sharply higher U.S. interest rates
and a mega-devaluation of the dollar"

" If this is the market consensus forecast"

"Neither has happened. The market doesn't buy your story -- why not?"

"The market could be wrong"

" it is time to focus
on how the international monetary system
evolves in the absence of crises"

" the incentives that have sustained the system to date
also provide a smooth convergence
to a new equilibrium in the long run."

" Our recent paper sets this mechanism out in detail"

" As Asian savings become less of a bargain for the U.S.
there will be a gradual reduction
in the U.S. current-account deficit"

"There will be bumps along the road "

" how can events we can't yet identify
deflect us from this underlying adjustment scenario"

* * *

Neither seems to have materialized. This year's U.S. current-account deficit will be far larger than last year's, and next year's budget deficit will be larger than this year's.

"The nice, slow real depreciation in the dollar against Asian currencies
needed to bring the U.S. trade deficit down
in a nice, safe, orderly and relatively pleasant way
over your extended time frame (30 years, a 1% real depreciation a year?)
has yet to really start"

" Interest rate differentials now favor the dollar"

"The euro-zone is attracting significant inflows from China
and the world's oil exporters,
helping keep euro-zone rates low.
But rather than generating a continent-wide
housing boom and a continent-wide consumption boom
low rates seem to be prompting
a boom in European capital flows to the U.S"

"part of the answer is that many investors do have short-time horizons.
To date, no one has made money betting against
the People's Bank of China in the Treasury market"

". Most seem to expect Bretton Woods II
will last at least until they get this year's bonus"

Still,
" net private financial flows
are not large enough to finance a $800 billion-plus U.S. current account deficit"

" with $600 billion or so in global reserve accumulation this year
the private sector doesn't have to."

" private investors put about $150 billion
more into emerging economies last year
than they took out."

" Emerging economies are financing the U.S.
because their central banks want to finance the U.S.;
private investors are quite willing
to finance the emerging world"

What worries me is that flows to the U.S. -- both private and official -- rest on rather shaky foundations, and as Brad Delong has argued, the markets seem to be pricing in virtually no chance of a bad outcome. Private investors finance the U.S. at low rates because they expect central banks to continue to finance the U.S. -- and even to step up their intervention if private flows falter.

" Since the markets are not demanding any adjustment now
the underlying imbalances keep getting bigger
In any standard model
the bigger the deficit and debt today
the bigger the needed dollar depreciation tomorrow "

" The amount China has had to spend to keep the yuan from rising
has grown every year for the past four years
; it will reach 15% of China's GDP this year.
If China continues to intervene at that pace
, its reserves would reach $2 trillion,
or 75% of its GDP, by the end of 2008"

"is the U.S. is politically prepared
to sit still as Chinese exports
to the U.S. double between 2004 and 2008,
as will happen even if a slow appreciation
of the yuan leads China's export growth
to slow to around 20%?

" Is the U.S. willing to accept the financial dependence on China
implied if the stability of the financial system requires
$300 to $400 billion in Chinese reserve growth every year?"

" a natural development for the system... (would be for)
... another periphery, seeing that this was a successful development strategy,
taking their place"

" the system lasts for a very long time
but the China part of it gradually fades"

"What will last"
" for the foreseeable futures the U.S. role as the center country in the system"

". In some periods this will generate large net inflows
of savings from the periphery to the U.S.
; in other periods, none at all or reversals."

" Clearly there was no effective periphery for 20 years
after the demise of Bretton Woods I
and the U.S. built a net asset position in international markets"
.
" When a new periphery emerges
we will have to carefully evaluate
the incentives and constraints faced by the system at that time"

" the policy community is unanimous in the view that the U.S. must adjust".

"Your argument rests on the assumption
that the U.S. current-account deficit
is driven by the U.S. fiscal deficit."

" If so, why have European and Japanese fiscal deficits,
which are higher still
in the presence of much lower growth,
not generated current-account deficits?"

" if U.S. fiscal deficits are pulling in foreign savings
, why are they doing so at very low rates?"

" Is it in the self interest of the governments
that now feed the international monetary system
with their savings to continue to do so? "

"our framework suggests they will -- not forever,
but for a long time.
It isn't because they like us
or have an irrational attachment to dollar assets.
They would like to look like Japan in 10 years"

" China's goods are cheap with the yuan at eight yuan to the dollar;
they would still be cheap at six."

" Imagine how receptive the U.S. would be to Chinese goods with the interest rate at 7%"

". The currency policy regime
has the effect of keeping the interest rate low,
splitting the interests of productive factors
in the U.S."

" and putting off the date
that the protectionist political coalition
might organize."

" The real threat to the U.S.
is that the liberal economic world
that is emerging will crumble
under the weight of massive global excess labor"

* * *
setser:

"the periphery is maintaining undervalued real exchange rates
building up reserves
, and in the process keeping interest rates
in the center lower than they otherwise be"

" corporate sectors.. are saving rather than investing"

" Our disagreement is simple:
You see the system as fundamentally stable,
both politically and economically. I don't."

" compare two different international systems.
In one, the periphery builds up its reserves,
those reserve flow through finance capital outflows
from the center to the periphery,
and no one runs either a current-account deficit
or a current-account surplus
Think $50 billion in foreign direct investment flows
from the U.S. and Europe to China,
off set by a $50 billion buildup in Chinese reserves"

"That roughly characterizes Bretton Woods I
and, incidentally, also describes reasonably well
Europe's relationship with the "periphery" right now"

". That system collapsed
when De Gaulle got tired of financing
the American corporate takeover of France."

" stable, so long as China and India
are willing to subsidize
U.S., European, Japanese and Korean multinational corporations"

" In the current system,
the periphery runs a large current-account surplus
and builds up its reserves,
financing a large current-account deficit
in the center country.
Actually, in the past few years,
the U.S. current-account deficit
and the current-account surpluses
of the periphery have all grown
, both absolutely and as share of GDP.
Reserve accumulation by the periphery
went from $116 billion in 2001 to $517 billion in 2004
and maybe $600 billion this year,
while the U.S. current-account deficit went from $390 billion
to $800 billion."

"the U.S. must reduce its dependence on foreign savings
, whether by saving more or investing less,"

" the best way to bring about that adjustment
is through cutting the fiscal deficit"

". Would you all rather see a fall in private investment
, or a surge in household savings?"

" the core reason
why the U.S. has to adjust
is that the trade and transfers deficit
(6.5% of U.S. GDP)
is now large relative to the U.S. export base (10% of GDP).
Current exchange rates
and U.S. growth rates imply
a widening trade deficit,
and I don't think that deficit
can continue to increase for much longer"

"keeping the U.S. current-account deficit constant
implies a fall in the U.S. trade deficit over time."

" implications."

"The periphery will not be able to rely on exports
as much as it has until now
to support growth."

" Real interest rates in the center cannot fall further"

" U.S. consumption won't be able to keep on growing
faster than U.S. income "

" The fun part of Bretton Woods II -- even in your vision -- is close to over"

" China has to keep on intervening
not to support an expanding export sector,
but just to hold on to its existing export sector.
The U.S. needs continued reserve inflows
from China not to allow housing prices to keep on rising,
but to keep them from falling. Yuck."

"But even a less fun system could be a stable system
-- that, I take it, is your argument."

" China's workers will keep on accepting low real wages;"

" China's taxpayers will keep on adding to the amount
that they eventually will have to spend
to bailout their central bank (and their banks); "

"U.S. and other firms will continue to make
so much in China that they will sustain
the political consensus
for open markets
, despite opposition from U.S. manufacturing workers,"

"• The winners from the current U.S.-China trade
don't realize that U.S.-China trade is responsible
for their success.
Home owners in Orange Country
and real estate brokers in Florida
are not lobbying for China to hold on to the yuan peg.
The U.S. Treasury -- the biggest winner of all in some sense --
is lobbying China to change the peg."

"• The upper Midwest is the epicenter of the (very troubled) U.S. auto industry.
China's auto sector is developing fast.
A slowing U.S. economy, no matter why the economy is slowing,
will increase, not decrease, demands for protection."

"• China (and others) may not be willing to continue
to accept low-yielding U.S. assets,
and so far, the U.S. has been willing
to trade Treasury IOUs for Chinese goods,
but not to trade U.S. oil companies for Chinese goods.
A Chinese de Gaulle would rail at the inequity.

• The transition from a win/win (fast growing exports/falling real rates) system
to a don't lose/don't lose (existing exports/relatively low rates)
may prove difficult.

* * *

dooley

. "U.S. can't take it story" and invoking protectionism
as the main threat.
We agree completely on this as a serious threat.
Indeed, the thrust of the whole system
is to spread around sufficient payouts
to undermine this threat.

6. You are telling a "Europe is resilient story"
in that it passes through the inflows.
But some of the deflationary pressure
must be sticking to Europe.
Europe has grown only unemployment in the last few years.

" You believe "that the U.S. must reduce its dependence
on foreign savings."
We still do not understand the basis for this belief.

" Our view is simple: It is in their interest to lend
and in our interest to borrow
. Asia won't wake up one day
and decide this is a bad deal
because it is not a bad deal.

Also informative was your nonresponse to several points that I think are important. For example, the U.S. has a fiscal deficit that is little different from those of the other industrial countries and better in several cases, even after factoring in the Katrina one-off.
No more definitive experiment on the current account
could have been run to prove
to prove current accounts are not mirror images of fiscal deficits

" Would it not be fruitful to spend some effort
working on filling in the model of how disturbances
work themselves through a model of Bretton Woods II dynamics?"

* * *
steser

" concern is that U.S. fiscal deficits are too large
for an economy whose households don't save."

" China has been more able than I expected to absorb
a massive reserve increase without excessive credit growth
or domestic inflation."

" By curbing lending growth with controls,
the central bank created a captive market
for low-interest rate sterilization bills."

" reserve diversification matters less than the overall pace of reserve accumulation"

" Since the renminbi needs to appreciate against both the dollar and euro,
borrowing in renminbi
to buy either still strikes me as losing bet.
There is a reason why Zhou has been pushing for change".

" as the rest of Asia stepped down,
the Middle East and Russia stepped up
Most oil exporters still peg to the dollar "

" Russia and OPEC into U.S. debt securities --
the oil exporters either have huge offshore dollar deposits,
or bought in ways that don't register cleanly in the U.S. data."

concerns:

The small size of the U.S. tradables sector
likely implies very large falls in the dollar will be needed
to bring down the very large gap
between what the U.S. imports
and what the U.S. exports
(a key point made by Rogoff and Obstfeld).
There may be a gap between the capital stock
the U.S. has
and the capital stock the U.S. needs
to respond quickly to dollar depreciation
(see DeLong).
Suburban housing doesn't generate export revenue.

"The U.S. is going to have large external financing needs
for some time. Suppose the U.S. trade and transfers deficit peaks
at 7.0% in the fourth quarter
and falls by 0.5% of GDP each of the next three years,
a major shift, bringing the trade and transfers deficit
to 5.5% of GDP in 2008.
Rising interest payments still imply
a current account deficit of a 6.5% of GDP
-- more than in 2004."

"Net private flows don't come close
to covering the U.S. external deficit now,
even with large interest rate differentials
in the dollar's favor.
If the U.S. slumps and U.S. rates fall,
the official sector may need to step up its intervention
from its current, very high pace,
to keep the dollar from going into free fall."

"The U.S. exposure to an external interest-rate shock keeps rising.
Gross U.S. external liabilities are around 100% of U.S. GDP,
most of that is debt,
and much of the debt is short-term.
The IMF forecasts they will rise to 150%
of U.S. GDP in 2010,
even if the U.S. starts to adjust.

Superpowers in the past
have generally been net creditors
and net lenders,
not net debtors and big borrowers.
The U.S.'s biggest financier -- China --
is viewed by many in the U.S.
as a strategic rival.
One international monetary system,
two very different political systems.

U.S. policy makers are not accustomed to the constraints
that a big net debtor often faces
. You all don't think the center faces any constraints
; I am not so sure.
In the initial Bretton Woods system,
U.S. policy was constrained by the dollar/gold parity.

What happens if U.S. policy makers are perceived to ignore
the concerns of our foreign creditors,
and they want to introduce a few constraints into Bretton Woods II?

what should be done?

• The U.S. should close the structural gap
between tax revenues and government spending.

• China should let the renminbi rise more now,
and the rest of Asia should follow
It also needs to get off a dollar peg for real,
and take a series of steps
to boost consumption.
Less government savings would help,
as would a modern social-insurance system.

• The Middle Eastern oil exporters should stop pegging
to the dollar.
Surpluses countries should not peg
to the world's biggest deficit country.

• The evidence from Germany suggests
that labor-market reforms
, on their own, are as likely to drag down
European domestic demand
as raise it.
I wouldn't bank on them to spur global rebalancing.
But steps to make German consumption more responsive
to low euro rates would help
. More generally, macro policies in Europe
need to be stimulative

Posted by lady eve at November 13, 2005 01:29 PM

House of Paine

November 13, 2005

the great debate

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