nice neo-lib
fable
by jb clark award winner
==================================
i quote
"economic institutions encouraging
economic growth
emerge
when political institutions
1) allocate power to groups
with interests in
BROAD BASED PROPERTY RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
2) create effective constraints on power-holders
3) minimize rents to be captured by power holders "
-------------------------------------------
SO WHATS THE MODEL LIKE ?
CIRCULAR OF COURSE
or is it ....?
---------------------
the spectre returns
part x
------------------------
notes on KM 's influence
now that his spectre is buried under the rubble
of the berlin wall.....
is it safe in e-con-com academe
to echo his social models ??????
klass struggle as the motor of history...
the state as an instrument of klass power ......
obviously these fellahs
were not a date-able pair
during the kold war
burger prime time
this pair traveled around in a .....cage
today
after all his parties are over
can his class struggle model
pass right thru the ivy halls door check?
seems so
just so long as he uses
an alias
" hni
i'm
mr de jure power
and
he's
mr de facto power
we're hardly friends
but
we won't cause a fight tonite ...
yes madamoiselle
today
after the wall fall
the klass clash two
can
come to the academic ball
dressed as
blobs of course
well larded imps
and even admit while dancing cheek to cheek
with some first rate academic chickee
" he's
the social conflictor "
and
" i'm...
the ultimate extractor "
---------------------------------------
turning to ace's opus ....
one quickly notices
that despite
the snappy attack
on economism
embedded in it all
its the mild slow gradual tales
slow mobilizations
the vague ness of incremental progression
and most off
the free burger beau ideal
of
secure private possesion
liberty of
productive and commercial enterprise
and on top
a state
tamed by powerful pop-rep body
produced
out of a broad broad broader franchise
these are the heros of ace's
500 year saga
----------------------------
random thoughts ....
the attempt to build
"a serious"
set
of functional relationships
between
a basic real life system
of commodity production
and its super structure :
the legal-political
contivences
raised above this market system
wow in academe
have its actors
turn out to be economic classes
even by other names and
cloaked in shapeless disguise....
as a scientific model ....
wow
econ -com
" institutions "
are able to change
both the rate and direction
of expansion
wow
and as these econ -com institutions
are altered
significant group inpacts
on resources shares may vary
and differing share consequences
may lead to a tussle for power
at the higher level of political instsitutions ....
shit
this marx as told by aesop
the de facto econ-com institutions
are a variable
which themselves are
a function of political institutions
aka "the state "
the ultimate power
struugle over the shape of political institutions
is over future resource shares
yes
political institutions
shape share relationships
-----------------
why ace is not afraid of his own model???
being a proponent
of broadly based growth
he figures
there is never too much freedom
or
too many market players
and this has an implied belief
in these yieldings
more democracy yields more property protection yields
more growth yields more development
he has trouble contrasting good elite actions vs bad elite actions in a sequence that obviuosly cause history to march in its usual left right left step by step fashion
the neutral terms amuse
economic classes are named in all their particulars
but not called classes
the spuer structure is fragments into institutions
elites are best labeled groups holding legal power
power itself
like utility else where
is here measureable quantity that builds up in various pans and the scales register the shifts prehaps with sudden bursts of the final wheel
because of an everelaborating gearing system
concentrated powerr leads to the usual problems
large poor groups face the usual collective action hump
groups can't have faith in each other
self interest leads to tit for tat class relations
the state's monopoly on power is only on legitimate power
legitemacy has certain mulitpilcatuive effects on the rsaw power inherent in a class's eco share
the state can act as an extractor directly
or a facilitater of it indirectly
by its rules
not bad one awaits the moment
sudden ghastly results
that this course leads to
frightens ace off his clarity even further
my wonderment is how many big chunks of treees a guy like this can apprehend
with out the total gestalt choking him
one of the many
progressive out comes
of marx is dead
is this rediscovery of proto marxian notions
and how well they fit
the historical record
the words power and rents
broad based do a great deal of heavy lifting
off stage
or at best
they struggle amongst themselves
like dark in distinct shapes clashing by night
here's a touch
the de facto winners of a power struggle
intstitutionalize their advantages if and when they can
the state is the legitimized mechanism of the winners rent flow rig
but what of laisez faire?
thats when the spontaneous rsults of economic institutions favor
adequately the winners
the state system "influences future de jure political power moves "
thru one groups agents being in the executive offices of state force
economic preferences lead to clashes
because
a's gain is usually z's loss
when and ifthis conflict of outcome choices arise
a win win mostly isn't enforceable
why ? cause efficency and distribution can not be seperated
enforcement requires a neutral third party state
another kold war fantasy
to ace the state is always a contending party so .....
de jures vs de factos
as the rival rent seekers
line up
thosein control
of the state have
the advantage
remember pinochet proves
the state can brake its own rules ....
power grows out of resources
the distribution of resources
more resopurces leads to more power
because its
interest opposers
must leap from collective inertia
into co ordinated action
only then
once this internal barrier to action
within the shifting tides of the power balance
periods of dual power
and civil war are inherent possibilities
political institutions are durable
because they have a ready organized force at hand
its maintenece cost
often billed to the oppressed and super exploited
because they over come the mobilization problem
of a dispersed opposer group
colective action:
a hard hill to climb
an old kold war social democratic fantasy
a general theory of optimal state extractions
would notice revenue sources that least effect growth
secure property rights is hardly the lasso that ropes this mission
enclosures were massive violations of use rights
and propery rights
but the pro growth way
was to favor thew interests opf the big land holders
which means not boraden opportunity but narrow it
the crop price board set ups worked pro growth
only when a compact gbig grower group
could force up prices paid
again broader bases are not pro growth
peasnt vote democracy
would have prevented enclosure one suspects
on the other hand
pro growth
fights over cash crop pricesin ghana by the peon farmers
would have thretened industrialization
by the way what about the five year plan
covered indirectly by the korean chaesol story
a stage exists where stalinoid systems might work
if corruption is prevented
and motivation of the ranks maintained
up shot
by picking and choosing his spots
the parable of growth gets a pro liberal market twist
a full disclosure of her contradictory couse by cleo wouldn't validate
that would
mass voter enfranchisement
elites figure in the long run
forcin em
ain't so cost effective
as foolin em
and forced raw ed like anti booze campaigns
are a burger elite scam
Posted by pinky at July 9, 2005 06:55 AM
Thanks for signing in, . Now you can comment. (sign out)
(If you haven't left a comment here before, you may need to be approved by the site owner before your comment will appear. Until then, it won't appear on the entry. Thanks for waiting.)